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FERC RULING UNDERMINES ENERGY FEDERALISM
AND ARBITRARILY TARGETS MID-ATLANTIC REGION
RENEWABLES
Philip Killeen*
art II of th e Federa l Power Act (FPA) requires th at
all pri ces set for the sa le of electri city affecting inte rstate comm erce betwee n electrical utiliti es be "just and
reasonable." 1 Pursuant to thi s requireme nt, th e FPA authori zes
the Federal Energy Regul atory Commi ss ion (FERC) to suspend
such electricity sa les prices upon findin g that they undul y di sadvantage or di scriminate between locations or types of power
pl ants. 2 In ass igning thi s limited jurisdiction to the federal government, and by ex pli citly reserving to the states the ex clu sive
juri sdiction over the mix of power plants suppl y ing electricity
demand, the FPA mandates a cooperative federali sm model of
electricity sector regul ation .3
A rece nt FE R C rulin g in Calpine Corp. v. PJM
Interconnection, LLC4 expa ns ive ly interprets federal reg ul atory authori ty under the FPA, asserting th at state subsidi es fo r
c lea n energy provid e ground s for FERC to suspe nd electri city
price-setting acti vity.5 Thi s Arti cle argues th at FERC's ruling
in Calpine not onl y undermin es the FPA's federa li st structure,
but also arbitrarily and capri cious ly pena li zes state support fo r
re newabl e and nuclear e ne rgy while permitt in g hi stori c a nd
ongoing state support for foss il -fu el based electricity. By rejecting states' legitimate preferences fo r low emi ss ions electricity,
FERC 's Calpine rulin g limits states' ability to mitigate clim ate
change by reducing greenhouse gas emi ss ions fro m the electri city sector. These efforts are parti cul arl y importa nt at a time when
federal leadership on climate change is conspi cuously absent. 6

P

I. THE

FEDERALIST BALA'iCE IN

ELECTRICIT\ SECTOR REGULATIO'\'

While fo und ed as vertica l monopoli es , e lectri c utiliti es
today exi st in a nati ona lly interconnected market. 7 Utiliti es have
dramati cally improved service reliabil ity and reduced operating
costs by sharin g power generati on, transmi ss ion, and di stributi on infras tructure in regional electrical grids. 8 FERC has exercised its juri sdi ction over the resulting interstate comm erce by
mandating the fo rmation of reg ional transmi ss ion organizati ons
( RTOs) to coo rd inate, co ntro l, and monitor reg ional electri ca l
grid s. 9 Among other ro les , RTOs sati sfy electri c ity de ma nd
across the ir g rid by operatin g a uction s in whi c h electri c ity
generation compani es (GENCOs) compete to se ll electri city to
utilities at the lowest pri ce. 10 RTOs set a fl at "clea ring" pri ce
received by all GENCOs at th e lowest bidding pri ce that sati sfies
the demand fo r the entire network. 11
Exerci sing their concurrent jurisdicti on over in -state power
pl ants, the Di stri ct of Co lumbi a and ten of the thirteen states in
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th e M id-At la nti c reg ion RTO , PJ M , imple mented Re newabl e
Portfo li o Sta nd ards (RPS). 12 RPS programs require that utilities
serving the state source a spec ifi ed percentage of the ir electricity
suppl y from spec ifi ed renewabl e and nuclear e ne rgy reso urces.1 3 To meet RP S ta rgets, state governm ents and utiliti es offer
a co mbin ati o n of subsidies to re newabl e and nuc lear energy
GENCOs, including rebates, tax in centi ves, a nd c redits. 14 In
Calp ine, a natu ral gas GENCO fil ed a comp la int w ith FERC
claiming PJM states ' RPS subsidi es "artifi cially suppress" PJM
electri c ity pri ces by a llowing " un competiti ve" re newabl e and
nuclear energy GENCOs to submit bids that do not reflect their
actual costs. 15 FERC commi ss ion ers subsequently ordered PJM
to " miti gate" the effect of state re newa bl e energy s ubsidi es in
the interstate electri city market. 16

II.

FERC's CALPJ.VE RLu c

U

DER:\11'.'IES

STATE JLRJSDICTIO"li OVER l'\TRASTATE
ELECTRICITY

GE

ERATIO '

In Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 17 the Supreme
Court e mph as ized that, given the inte rconnected na ture of the
modern electri c g rid, FERC 's inte rstate regul atio ns and states'
intrastate regulati ons will inev ita bl y affect each oth er. 18 These
crossover impacts are not only permi ss ibl e but inte nded under
the FPA's federa li st structure; the only limitation is th at neith er
sovereign may intenti onally target the othe r's jurisdi cti on. 19 T he
mere ex istence of crossover impacts is not suffi c ie nt to show
intentional targeting; instead, to show that a state overreached its
j uri sdi cti on, a pl a inti ff GENCO mu st prove that the state directly
conditi oned or " tethe red" the GENCO 's s ubsidy e li g ibility on
suppl ying electr icity through an RT0.20
Th e RPS subs idi es at iss ue in Calpine do no t satisfy th e
Hughes intenti onal ta rgeting test. The RPS subs idi es are di stin guis hed fro m othe r state ene rgy po li c ies rejected by FERC
a nd co urts beca use they neithe r required subsid ized GENCOs
to submit bid s th at c lear PJM 's capac ity marke t a ucti on nor
gua ranteed th ose GENCO s an e lectri c ity p ri ce di stin ct from
the interstate who lesa le clearing pri ce set by the RT0. 21 In thi s
regard, the RP S subs idi es are ne ithe r inte nti ona ll y targeted at
RTO electri city markets under federa l juri sdi cti on no r "tethered"
to GEN CO partic ipati on in PJM 's capac ity ma rket, and thus
fa ll squa rely w ithin state jurisdi cti on. In rnling tha t RTOs may
frustrate state subs idi es for in-state power pl ants not directl y ti ed
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to RTO market participation , FERC's Calpine rulin g implies
an unlimited federal juri sd iction over GE COs, which was not
contemplated by FPA's statutory structure.

III. FERC's C 1LPJiVE Rt.,u G ARBITRARILY
T \RGETS RE E\\ \BLEA D NLCLE\R E ERG\'.
Regardl ess of its exerci se of jurisdiction, FERC's application of the FPA's "j ust and reasonabl e" provi sion in Calpine to
overturn PJM states' RPS subsidies for renewabl e and nuclear
energy is arbitrary and capricious. 22 FERC's mandate to ensure
RTO electricity wholesale rates are "just and reasonable" is, in
essence, an obligation to reflect the price that an efficient market
would produce.23 FERC's Calpine ruling emphasized that state
RPS subsidies threaten the integrity of PJM 's capacity market
because they a llow certain GE COs to submit s uppressed
bid s in PJM capacity market without competing on a comparable basis with "co mpetitive" resources .24 However, FERC's
Calpine rulin g arbitraril y ignores the market distorting effects
of longstanding state and federal subsidies for fossil fuel-based
electricity generation. 25 These subsidies have propped up uneconomical and aging fossil fuel power plants by allowing fossil
fuel GE COs to submit suppressed bids into RTO capacity markets .26 A reasonable and hi storically consistent application of
FERC's Calpine standard, therefore, would require PJM to mitigate states ' longstandin g subsidy support for fossil fuel-based
electricity, not just its newer subsidy support for renewable and
nuclear energy.

More fundamentally, however, FERC's Calpine ruling arbitrarily ignores that government subsidies reflecting the relati ve
environmental benefits of low-emi ss ions electricity generation
are essential to reaching the efficient market outcome mandated
by the FPA. 27 Without subsidy program s encourag ing lo wem issions electric ity ge neration , RTO markets wi ll continue to
produce inefficient outcomes for the U.S . electrical grid and
the public. 28 Furthermore, emissions credits for renewable and
nuclear energy GE COs, like those at issue in Calpine, are
awarded based on the positive environmental attributes of the
electricity eligible GE COs produce, rather than based on the
value of that electricity in a RTO market. 29 Since these credits are
traded in secondary markets wholly separate from RTO electricity auctions and reflect the environmental, rather than economic,
value of electricity generation , th ey are effectively untethered to
wholesale electricity markets under federal jurisdiction. 30

IV.

Co"'ICLl.J SIO

Co nsi stent with th e federalist desi gn of the FPA and its
interpretation of "just and reasonable" electricity prices in RTO
markets, FERC should permit PJM states' legitimate pursuit of
a c leaner and more economically efficient e lectricity resource
mix . By failing to do so, FERC's Calpine ruling curtails essential state leadership on climate change.
:a,..
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